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18 Ethics and critical thinking
Jonathan B. Wight

This chapter seeks to demonstrate that investigations in positive economics rely on
ethical perspectives and practices, and further, that critical thinking requires a wider
ethical viewpoint than normative economics generally permits. Positive economics generally relies, for example, on the unsung virtues of the investigator who demonstrates
honesty and transparency in the search for truth. Ethical failures in this regard are not
uncommon (DeMartino, 2011 ). But another unstated ethical perspective appears in the
worldview from which a researcher sets out to model behavior. Modelers almost always
assume that rationality requires that an economic actor undertake an action in pursuit of
a goal or end. Hence, positive economics is said to be the analysis of outcomes based on
a theoretical understanding of causal relationships (if action X is taken, outcome Y will
result). This broad analytical approach is termed consequentialism.
A widely recognized form of consequentialism is utilitarianism, from which modern
welfare economics evolved. Welfare consequences are examined only in regard to desired
outcomes, such as the metric of satisfying consumer preferences. This approach is so
thoroughly ingrained that many economic practitioners fail to recognize the judgments
involved: first, that outcomes are assumed to be the only value, and second, that only a
particular outcome (satisfying preferences) counts in the economic assessment of welfare.
In short, while economists may believe they are mainly doing science, they are usually
doing far more philosophy than they acknowledge (Hausman and McPherson, 2006).
While traditional calculations of welfare based on market valuations are important,
the analysis of public policy demands critical thinking that goes beyond this. Ronald
Coase observed that:
[T]he choice between different social arrangements for the solution of economic problems
should be carried out in broader terms than this and that the total effect of these arrangements
in all spheres oflife should be taken into account. As Frank H. Knight has so often emphasized,
problems of welfare economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals
(1960, p. 43).

To address these points, the following sections provide a review of alternative ethical
frameworks that can enrich students' understanding of controversial public policies.

ALTERNATIVE ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS
Despite its allure, the analysis of outcomes is not the only normative approach and
in some cases it is insufficient for understanding economic institutions, behaviors and
policies. Consequentialism was attacked in the mid-1700s, for example, by Immanuel
Kant (1724-1804), who argued on the basis of pure practical reason that we have a duty
to treat others as ends in themselves. An examination of the duties of rational agents
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produces a process for making decisions (Kant, 1785). In Kant's approach, the ends can
never justify the means. Kantian philosophers routinely analyze public policies such as
climate change, prostitution, selling body parts, sweatshops, and other economic issues
using this duty-based perspective - which is fundamentally at odds with the neoclassical welfare approach. This does not mean that Kant was opposed to prices, profits,
or markets; only that his method of evaluating their appropriateness to society was
diametrically different.
Likewise, John Locke's rights-based ethical framework begins with the notion that
humans have "inalienable" entitlements (life, liberty, and happiness) that cannot be
abridged. A "right" is the flip side of a "duty": my right not to be harmed imposes a
duty on you not to harm me. No valuable outcome (such as greater economic efficiency)
should deprive someone of their rights. The law and economics movement, which
presses judges to make legal decisions based on calculations of economic welfare, is fundamentally at odds with a rights-based approach. Thus, in Kelo v. New London (2005),
the Supreme Court ruled five to four that Suzette Kelo could be forced off her land by
powers of eminent domain, even though the City of New London was simply acting as an
agent for a private developer who wished to use her land to build expensive condominiums on the waterfront. Economic welfare trumped Kelo's property rights.
Another normative tradition is that of virtue ethics. Since Socrates, philosophers have
evaluated states of affairs by considering the motives and characters of economic agents.
Adam Smith (1723-90) devoted considerable attention to analyzing why intentions mattered to judgment. To most modern economists, motives are irrelevant since only outcomes matter. However, a growing number of philosophers, including economists such
as McCloskey (2006) and Sen (1977), are interested in reviving the discussion of virtue
ethics. Two dimensions are of particular interest: First, both utilitarian and Kantian
ethics start from the premise that moral agents have the will and the self-control to
carry out actions that conform to their respective ethical traditions. By contrast, virtue
ethics assumes that people need to be taught, encouraged, and even cajoled to control
contradictory impulses. Justice is the virtue of acting with a proper balance of interests
toward self and others. Proper socialization and moral suasion provide a process that
can mold preferences toward virtuous habits - such as toward personal and even civic
responsibility (Sandel, 1998).
A second dimension of virtue ethics in Adam Smith is that humans have limited
powers of rationality. As a starting point, people will often rely on their instinctive
feelings- hence the title of Smith's first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).
Moral sentiments provide the building blocks used to create institutions (rules and laws).
A good society requires that people develop an internal commitment to obey the rules
in society- rather than calculating gain or loss. However, moral sentiments can and do
evolve, hence the duties of a citizen are expected to change over time.
The Public Policy of Slavery

Consider how the three ethical approaches can aid a teacher in analyzing the following
public policy question: Is slavery a good or bad institution? A consequentialist would
focus on the outcomes of slavery. More specifically, an economist would analyze the particular outcome of maximizing the economic surplus, calculating the gains and losses to
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society of forced labor (assuming that property rights in slaves exist). In a modern costbenefit analysis, it is not necessary to show that everyone gains from a policy change (the
Pareto condition), but only that winners would win more than losers would lose. Using
this approach, slavery could be justified on efficiency grounds if people's preferences
(measured by willingness to pay) are better satisfied by this institution than without it,
given the current distribution of income and wealth.
Kantians would reject the economic efficiency argument as deeply flawed. From a
Kantian perspective one would proceed quite differently, by deducing fundamental laws
of duty based on treating others with respect. Because Kant says we have a duty not
to treat others merely as a means to our own ends, a policy of slavery would be wrong
regardless of any beneficial outcomes. Rights-based ethicists would equally object,
since owning one's own labor is the most "sacred and inviolable" of all rights (Smith
1981, p. 138). Virtue ethicists would not necessarily be opposed to slavery (slavery was
widespread in early times and religious leaders like Jesus noted the appropriate duties
of a slave). However, moral sentiments evolve and slavery can be viewed with new eyes.
Smith's moral sentiments approach would place an impartial observer in the shoes of a
slave and engage the imagination of "fellow-feeling." To Smith, moral imaginings are
stimulated by art, music, and literature (Wight, 2006). Thus, after Harriet Beecher Stowe
published Uncle Tom's Cabin in 1852, the fellow-feelings of free citizens were aroused
because they could understand, and empathize with, the feelings of slaves. From this
perspective, abolitionists were inspired to end slavery not because of economic calculations of deadweight losses and not because of rational deductions of duty, but because
a large number of people had become emotionally outraged at injustice. To Smith, the
impetus for changing institutions and public policies arises from the evolution of moral
imagination.
This discussion does not diminish the insights of economic analysis, but identifies
complementary (and at times contradictory) critical-thinking traditions that enrich a
student's comprehension of public policies. Economists regularly argue cases based on
efficiency grounds without considering rights, duties, and other claims. However, only 12
percent of the world's people in 2010 enjoyed basic human rights ensured by democratic
constitutions or laws.' Highly controversial public issues (e.g. same sex partners, the
environment, legalizing the sale of organs) generally entail considerations that cross the
boundaries of ethical frameworks. The thesis presented below is that it is preferable to
engage students from their own starting ethical beliefs and then build intellectual bridges
toward the economic way of thinking.

CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES
Rather than lecturing on the three alternative ethical theories, one can simply allow
students to uncover these in class activities. Wight and Morton (2007) provide a set of
ten active-learning exercises that engage students in economic problem solving with
a modest dose of ethical theory. Lessons include the ethical foundations of efficiency,
market sales of kidneys, outsourcing in sweatshops, Rawlsian economic justice, and the
role of self-interest in economic analysis. An additional lesson, discussed here, is called
the "Desert Island" game (Wight, 2009b). On the first day of class, students are randomly
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placed in groups of four to five and asked to select a leader. Each leader receives a candy
bar and is informed that the group is shipwrecked on an island; the leader has five to
ten minutes to decide what to do with the candy bar. Based on an analysis of 165 leader
decisions over multiple class sections and academic years, principles students show an
overwhelming preference for pro-social behavior manifested by cooperation and equal
rationing in most cases. 2
When students are queried as to why they prefer an equal-sharing approach (in over
80 percent of the groups), their responses are often emotionally charged. Many simply
assert that in times of crisis, the proper allocation is equitably, and they exhibit vocal
clues as to the degree of moral outrage at any other suggestion. 3 Students' reactions
generally conform to experimental evidence. When faced with a moral dilemma, humans
commonly respond in an instinctively emotional way. Haidt (2001) demonstrates using
fMRI scans that moral decisions activate the brain hemisphere where affective cognition
takes place; later, when justification is called for, another hemisphere fires to produce
logical rationalizations. Primate studies reinforce the notion that some aspects of
social interaction are hardwired, such as the emotional desire for fairness (Brosnan and
deWaal, 2003).
The Desert Island activity demonstrates that the economic approach to welfare,
valuing outcomes on the basis of consumer preferences satisfied, is not intuitively
obvious to many students. Indeed it is largely alien to their thinking and feeling about
public policies. Students have been socialized within families, churches, clubs, and other
groups. Group psychology revolves around multi-layered judgments about fairness and
trust that directly affect the group's survival and evolution (Wight, 2009a). While standard economics generally portrays behavior as rationally self-interested (giving rise to
free-riders and sub-optimal Prisoners' Dilemma outcomes), experimental evidence finds
that people also operate within a more complex web of moral norms, legal rules, and
customs (Gintis et al., 2005). Ostrom (2000), for example, describes the properties of successful local governance in common goods as entailing the evolution of rules and norms
that give rise to reciprocity and trust and the perception of fairness.

DEFINING ECONOMICS
Lionel Robbins provides this commonly used definition: "Economics is the science
which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which
have alternative uses" (1945, p. 16). Robbins himself notes, however, that a discipline
cannot be defined in advance but only after the boundaries of investigation have been
determined. In proposing the ends and means definition, Robbins sought to stretch the
boundaries of the field beyond the confines of his day, in which economics was limited
to explaining only the causes of material welfare. Robbins expands it to include any
outcome-directed activity in which there are resource constraints. In light of the three
ethical frameworks presented in this chapter, students can be offered an even broader
definition:
Economics involves the systematic examination of the patterns of individual and
group behavior used for the provisioning of the socio-economic system.
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In addition to prices and markets, this definition encompasses duty and commitment in economic life (Sen, 1977) and the study of cognitive mechanisms that are not
consciously controlled, yet likely play a role in economic activity. Zak (2011), a neuroeconomist, provides evidence of an autonomous brain function that controls social
behaviors through the release of hormones such as oxytocin (the "moral molecule").
By varying hormone levels, Zak alters the degree of "fellow-feeling" and hence changes
behaviors in experimental settings. Hormones and neural networks appear to provide
the biological scaffolding for sociability that underlies Adam Smith's conception of
moral behavior.
Social modeling thus grapples with interpersonal ethical considerations that are
psychologically, philosophically, and biologically intertwined. Smith theorized that
humans pursue self-deceptive goals whose ultimate ends are not consciously knowable,
even as they serve higher purposes (1759, p. 183). The "invisible hand" arises within this
context: "It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry
of mankind" (1759, p. 183). For a classroom treatment of this subject, see Wight (2007).
Over the centuries, Smith's philosophy devolved into the separate (and, to a large
degree, isolated) disciplines of psychology, philosophy, economics, sociology, political science, and law. In the 1920s, Balliol College at Oxford (where Smith had studied)
began reintegrating the study of philosophy, politics, and economics (PPE). Teachers
can use the academic novel, Saving Adam Smith: A Tale of Wealth, Transformation, and
Virtue (Wight, 2002) to explore Smith's moral underpinnings for wealth creation as a
pillar of his market philosophy. There are presently more than 50 universities with PPE
programs, including Yale, Pennsylvania, Notre Dame, Glasgow, and Richmond. 4 A discussion of ethics is beginning to appear in principles textbooks. 5 A PPE approach can be
instituted in many economics classes without substantial opportunity cost.

JUSTIFYING AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
As noted above, Kantians use rationality for understanding the appropriate means
of acting (rather than for achieving a particular end). And virtue ethicists like Smith
explore the emotionally cognitive behaviors that arise from instincts needed for survival
in groups. Economists argue that people make rational decisions to achieve the goal
of maximizing utility. In reality, people make decisions for complex reasons, not all of
which can be understood by a single model. The practice of tipping at highway restaurants, for example, relates to all three approaches: first, because of a rational calculation
of reputation-building and future services to be received (economic); second, from logically derived rules for treating others with respect (Kantian); and third, from instinctual
fellow-feelings (Smithian). Many other economic behaviors can be modeled in deeper
ways than simply connecting means with desired ends.
If there are valid multiple perspectives, how can any one of these be "right"? One
approach is to simplify economics to produce a "single, coherent" set of concepts that
won't confuse students. 6 Hence, many teachers portray economics as engineering,
with non-controversial goals and methods that yield the "right" answers to allocation
questions. In his Nobel Prize address, Ronald Coase laments: "What is studied is a
system which lives in the minds of economists but not on earth. I have called the result
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'blackboard economics'." 7 In addition to being unscientific, "blackboard economics" is
antithetical to critical thinking (Nelson, 1989).
A commitment to critical thinking requires that teachers deal with complexity and
controversy. When policy issues are discussed, teachers should encourage students to
think outside the economists' toolbox. It is not simply that there are additional outcomes
(besides preferences) that could be considered, it is also that non-outcomes-based ways
of thinking are ubiquitous. During emergencies, people instinctively reject markets in
favor of rules for sharing derived from duty or virtue ethics. Non-price allocations are
also widely used in families, churches, and schools, institutions which are paternalistic
and geared toward cultivating virtuous habits in young people.
The moral justification for markets arises from considering the problems that arise
within these contexts (Wight, 2009b). Teachers can discuss Bentham's (1789) advocacy
of utilitarianism as a result of his growing discontent with policies imposed by authority
and precedent. In the 18th century, Enlightenment thinkers contended that the institutions of human society should be examined and debated just like the laws of physical
science; public policies should be chosen based on their outcomes rather than simply the
tyranny of tradition, or by misguided appeals to duties, rights or virtues. Hence, even
after considering the objections of other ethical frameworks, a strong justification for
policies based on a consequentialist cost-benefit analysis can be made (Frank, 2008).

CONCLUSION
Outcomes, duties, and virtues are three competing and overlapping ways of conceptualizing how to study the world of choice. By focusing on outcomes, economics teachers
make an ethical judgment about how a scientist should try to understand the world. For
this and other reasons, the demarcation between positive and normative economics is
blurred. The study of economic choices rarely is placed in the wider context of goals,
commitments, and virtues that comprise the active life of politics, business, and society.
This omission is curious and paradoxical, considering that "even in the most marketoriented economy, a majority of transactions do not actually go through markets"
(McMillan, 2003, p. 6). The ubiquity of non-price trade in households, governments,
and within firms suggests that social costs and trust play important roles in economic
life, even if unrecognized. Behavior derives from multiple origins, including expected
outcomes, duties and commitments, and conceptions of character. The pluralistic
account advocated here expands the scope of inquiry in positive economics and provides
a springboard for understanding non-neoclassical approaches to the analysis of public
policies.

NOTES
1.

The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy index 2010: democracy in retreat," http://graphics.eiu.com/
PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf(accessed 5 January 2011).
2. This is not an experiment and the "set-up" virtually ensures cooperation; few students want to appear
to be unsociable. This is Adam Smith's main point, that humans are highly social creatures and desire
approbation.
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3. Outcomes do not have to be equal to be equitable. Some group members may be heavier, or exert more
energy, and thus "need" more food. Equity in this context means something like, "From each according
to ability, to each according to need." Hence, students instinctively act like good communists (Samuelson
1969).
4. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy,_Politics_and_Economics (accessed 26 April2010).
5. See, for example, Cowen and Tabarrok (2010) and Goodwin et al. (2005).
6. This is the stated goal of the Council on Economic Education's revision of the Voluntary National
Content Standards in Economics. See; http://www.councilforeconed.org/ea/standards/standards_preface.
pdf (accessed 5 January 2011).
7. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/199l/coase-lecture.html (accessed 5 January 2011).
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